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1  | INTRODUC TION
Unregulated individual health insurance markets tend to risk rating 
and risk selection, both of which are undesirable from a societal 
and economic perspective.1-5 In practice, therefore, competition 
in these markets is combined with various regulatory measures to 
mitigate market failure and promote public objectives. To prevent 
risk rating, premium- rate restrictions are typically present. For 
example, in the individual and small group health insurance mar-
kets in the United States, risk rating is limited to age (within rate 
bands), region, and tobacco use. And in other countries, such as 
the Netherlands and Germany, premiums are community- rated per 
health plan. To prevent risk selection, a system of risk equalization 
(RE) is usually in place, which compensates insurers for predictable 
variation in medical spending. Risk selection has been defined as 
“actions by consumers and insurers to exploit unpriced risk het-
erogeneity and break pooling arrangements.”6 Given premium- rate 
restrictions, the goal of RE is to minimize risk- selection potential 
by correcting for unpriced risk heterogeneity, that is, by reducing 
predictable profits and losses on specific subgroups. This paper 
focuses on mitigating selection potential in the Dutch individual 
health insurance market.7
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Over the past decades, RE models in developed countries have 
evolved from simple demographic models to sophisticated morbidity- 
based models, often containing hundreds of risk classes.8-11 However, 
studies have consistently shown that even state- of- the- art RE models 
considerably under- or overpay specific subgroups in the respective 
populations, leaving significant selection potential (R. C. Van Kleef, F. 
Eijkenaar, & R. C. J. A. van Vliet, under review).10,12-17 Therefore, stake-
holders in these markets continue to seek to improve RE, with a strong 
focus on identifying individuals in poor health through the develop-
ment of new or enhanced morbidity indicators based on prior diagno-
ses or utilization.17-19 Importantly, however, there is another side of the 
issue; risk selection in competitive health insurance markets may also 
be driven by overcompensated groups of individuals in good health, 
indications of which have been found in several countries, including 
the United States,13,15,20,21 Switzerland,22 and the Netherlands.23-27
The Dutch RE model 2017, like most such models, includes nu-
merous variables meant to identify sicker, higher- cost individuals. 
Specifically, the model contains five morbidity- based risk adjusters, 
that is, pharmacy- based cost groups (PCGs), diagnosis- based cost 
groups (DCGs), durable medical equipment groups (DMEGs), phys-
iotherapy diagnosis groups (PDGs), and multiple- year high- spending 
(MYHS) groups.11 About 27% of the population is flagged by one or 
more of these variables. In this paper, the focus is on the complemen-
tary group of individuals not flagged by a morbidity variable (73% of the 
population) and who are thus implicitly designated as healthy. However, 
this group is likely to be heterogeneous in terms of health and spend-
ing, implying the existence of unpriced risk heterogeneity (and thus 
selection potential) within this group. The reason is 2- fold. First, not all 
chronic conditions involving predictable, above- average spending are 
captured by the morbidity variables. Second, the morbidity variables 
may not flag individuals in moderate health (eg, those who are just de-
veloping a chronic illness). For example, individuals are only classified 
in a PCG if they meet a threshold of 180 defined daily doses of the 
relevant drugs per year. Indeed, data confirm that many individuals with 
chronic illnesses are missed: About 50% of the Dutch population is con-
sidered to be chronically ill according to International Classification of 
Primary Care codes, with “chronic illness” defined as an illness without 
any prospect of full recovery.28 The result is that within the group with-
out a morbidity flag, individuals in moderate or poor health are under-
compensated while those in good health are overcompensated.
Using administrative data on medical spending and risk character-
istics over a 4- year period for the entire Dutch population (N = 16.6 m) 
as well as data from a health survey conducted among a large sample 
(N = 387 k) of that population, this paper investigates to what extent 
the Dutch RE model can be improved by explicitly identifying individuals 
likely to be healthy given their low prior spending levels. Specifically, our 
goal is 2- fold: (a) identifying healthy individuals on the basis of multiple- 
year low spending and (b) examining the impact of adding an indicator 
for “being healthy” into alternative versions of the RE model on pay-
ment fit (ie, the extent to which insurers’ revenues from RE match the 
insurance claims), both at the individual level and at the level of specific 
subgroups derived from the health survey. In addition, models are eval-
uated on their potential impact on cost- containment incentives, which 
is relevant here since adding the indicator for “being healthy” creates a 
link between (prior) spending and (future) RE payment.
The paper proceeds as follows. After a brief description of the 
Dutch health insurance system and RE model, the data and method-
ology are explained. Next, the main results are presented, followed 
by a discussion of the conclusions and the policy implications.
2  | THE DUTCH HE ALTH INSUR ANCE 
SYSTEM AND RISK EQUALIZ ATION MODEL
The Dutch health insurance system is based on Enthoven’s model 
of regulated competition, combining competition with regulation to 
promote efficiency and protect public objectives such as accessibil-
ity and affordability.7,29,30 Competition is driven by free consumer 
choice of health plan. Within bounds set by regulation, plans can 
differ in terms of provider network, coverage of out- of- network 
spending, and cost- sharing options. Regulation includes an individual 
insurance mandate, annual open enrollment, a standardized benefit 
package, community- rated premiums, and RE among insurers.11
In 2017, the Dutch RE system consisted of three different mod-
els: for somatic care (ie, primary care, hospital care, and pharma-
ceutical care), for mental care, and for the out- of- pocket payments 
due to the mandatory deductible (385 euro per person in 2017). In 
this paper, the focus is exclusively on the somatic model, pertain-
ing to about 90% of spending covered by the standardized benefits 
package. Coefficients of the RE model for year t are estimated by an 
individual- level ordinary least squares regression of spending in year 
t- 3 on risk characteristics from year t- 3 or before (depending on the 
risk adjuster). Prior to estimation, several modifications are applied 
to make the lagged data representative for year t.11
The somatic RE model 2017 contains almost 200 risk classes, in-
cluding 40 age/gender classes, 33 PCGs based on the prior use of 
drugs prescribed for chronic illnesses, 15 DCGs based on diagnoses 
of hospital treatment in the prior year, 10 DMEGs based on prior 
use of durable medical equipment, 4 PDGs based on diagnoses of 
physiotherapy in the prior year, and 7 MYHS groups based on high 
spending in the prior 3 years. With the exception of the PCGs and 
PDGs, the Dutch model does not include information on primary 
care diagnoses/utilization because the required information is not 
available for the whole population. This is also an important reason 
for why we use low spending as an indicator for “being healthy.”
In 2017, the RE model also contained two risk adjusters based 
on spending on home care and on geriatric rehabilitation care in the 
prior year. However, both adjusters are excluded here as the latter 
has recently been removed and the former will probably be replaced 
in the RE model of 2019.
The introduction of spending- based risk adjusters in the Dutch RE 
model is primarily a result of the importance being attached by rele-
vant stakeholders to mitigating risk- selection potential. There is strong 
preference for realizing this goal via ex ante compensation based on 
medically/clinically informed adjusters based on diagnoses and/or 
utilization linked to chronic illness. But as long as selection potential 
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remains and the data required for developing such adjusters are not 
available, spending- based adjusters have been used in the Dutch model 
since they can be effective in reducing unpriced risk heterogeneity. 
However, given the direct link between spending and RE payment, 
these adjusters reduce incentives for cost containment, implying a 
trade- off. In the opinion of the Dutch government (and other stake-
holders), the reduction in selection potential outweighs the reduction 
in incentives for cost containment. The government has stated, how-
ever, that spending- based risk adjusters are a second- best solution and 
will be replaced as soon as better alternatives become available.31
3  | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Administrative data and health survey data
Two datasets are available for this study. First, we use administra-
tive data on medical spending and risk characteristics for the entire 
Dutch population (N = 16.6 million) for a 4- year period (2011- 2014). 
These data were those actually used for calculating the coefficients 
of the RE models for the years 2014- 2017, respectively. We use 
these data to identify individuals likely to be healthy (in absolute 
sense) based on low prior spending, replicate the RE model 2017, and 
compare the individual- level fit of alternative versions of that model. 
We also use these data to simulate the impact of including an indi-
cator for “being healthy” on insurers’ cost- containment incentives.
In addition, models are compared on group- level fit. This is a 
common approach to quantifying unpriced risk heterogeneity in 
health insurance markets.32 This approach, however, requires health 
information not included in the RE model. Therefore, we use a sec-
ond dataset based on a health survey conducted among a large 
sample (N = 387 195) of the population in 2012. These data contain 
rich information on self- reported general health and chronic con-
ditions,33 which can be used to define subgroups with an over- or 
underrepresentation of people in poor health. In turn, for each of 
these subgroups, the mean actual spending can be compared with 
the mean spending predicted by alternative RE models, providing an 
indication of each model’s group- level fit.
The survey sample is not representative of the entire population in 
three ways. First, individuals living in an institution for long- term care are 
not included. Second, the sample only includes individuals of 19 years 
or over (on September 1, 2012). Consequently, results on group- level 
fit are conditional on the remaining (adult) sample. Third, the remaining 
sample was not drawn randomly. To correct for nonrandom sampling 
regarding several factors (eg, age, gender, ethnicity, and income), we re-
weighted the sample using weights supplied by Statistics Netherlands.
3.2 | Identifying healthy individuals on the basis of 
multiple- year low spending
Our first objective was to identify individuals likely to be healthy in 
absolute sense based on multiple- year low spending (MYLS). To our 
knowledge, low- spending indicators have not been used previously in 
a RE model, so our choice of thresholds (ie, the place in the spending 
distribution) and of the number of years necessary to be designated as 
healthy was based on our own judgment rather than previous empiri-
cal research. We chose a period of three consecutive prior years as a 
relatively high bar for consistency of low spending. Low spending in 
one or two prior years could easily be a result of (more or less) ran-
dom spread of insurance claims across calendar years or temporary 
upswings in health. In addition, 3 years corresponds to the definition 
of the current MYHS risk adjuster,34 contributing to within- model 
consistency. Nevertheless, we also investigated the potential added 
value of using two instead of three- year low spending.
Regarding the place in the spending distribution, we were guided 
by the finding that an estimated 50% of the Dutch population is 
not chronically ill (Volksgezondheidenzorg.info 2018a). We first de-
termined (by trial and error) the spending threshold in each of the 
three prior years (2011- 2013) that is required to yield 50% of the 
population in 2014. This resulted in a percentile of 69.7%, which we 
rounded to 70%, corresponding to a spending threshold of approx-
imately 1100 euro (about half of overall mean spending in 2014). 
According to this definition, individuals are designated as “healthy” 
in 2014 if they belong to the bottom 70% of the spending distribu-
tion in each of the three prior years 2011- 2013. To determine the 
sensitivity of our results for the choice of spending threshold, we 
also examine two alternative thresholds, 60% and 80%.
3.3 | Payment fit and cost- containment incentives
Separately for each of the three spending thresholds, we con-
structed an indicator for “being healthy” and incorporated it into the 
RE model 2017. The resulting models are compared on payment fit 
at the individual level and subgroup level. Individual- level fit is as-
sessed using the R- squared, Cumming’s prediction measure,35 and 
the mean absolute prediction error.
To assess models’ group- level fit, we first merged the actual 
spending and the predicted spending (based on each of the four 
models, which were all estimated on the administrative data contain-
ing all 16.6 million individuals) in 2014 with the health survey data 
using an anonymized individual- level identification key. Next, using 
the information in the survey data, we defined 28 subgroups that are 
overrepresented by individuals in either poor or in good health, and 
calculated the mean per person under/overcompensation for each 
of these subgroups by subtracting the mean actual spending from 
the mean predicted spending, separately for each model. Assessing 
payment fit in this way is considered an adequate method for quan-
tifying unpriced risk heterogeneity in health insurance markets, but 
is often not feasible in practice due to a lack of “external” health 
information that is not included in the RE model.32 We circumvent 
this problem by merging the administrative data with rich health in-
formation from a survey conducted among a large sample.
Almost 98% of the survey respondents matched successfully 
with the administrative data of 2014. Main reasons for an unsuccess-
ful match are death and migration in 2012 or 2013. Table 1 presents 
information on actual and predicted spending for adults in the ad-
ministrative data and survey respondents matching with these data. 
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Based on these results, the sample seems slightly healthier than the 
total adult population. Previous papers using the same data have 
presented more detailed comparisons of both groups and similarly 
concluded that the sample is slightly healthier (R. C. Van Kleef, F. 
Eijkenaar, & R. C. J. A. van Vliet, under review).19,36 In this study, 
this results in a small overcompensation on the sample of 46 euro. 
We did not correct for this overcompensation because (a) we do not 
know how it is distributed over specific groups, and (b) our goal is to 
assess the relative performance of alternative RE models rather than 
these models’ absolute performance. Nonetheless, we assessed the 
impact of recalibrating the survey data, such that for each model, the 
mean predicted spending equaled the mean actual spending. This 
did not alter our conclusions since the relative differences among 
models (which was our main focus) did not change.
Since adding the indicator for “being healthy” creates a link between 
(prior) spending and (future) RE payments, we also evaluate models on 
the potential impact on insurers’ cost- containment incentives by (a) 
qualitatively assessing the possibilities for strategic behavior (ie, stim-
ulating and/or not preventing individuals from exceeding the spending 
threshold) and (b) simulating the effect on RE payments of a small or 
medium- sized insurer letting its total insurance claims increase gener-
ically by 1% in the prior year (2013). In spirit, the latter relates to the 
“power measure” developed by Geruso and McGuire,37 with the main 
difference that we examine the marginal change in RE payments due 
to a marginal change in claims (instead of utilization). This measure de-
scribes how regulators compensate spending at the margin, or how RE 
impacts insurers’ marginal incentive to contain costs. In the Netherlands 
as well as in many other countries, this is relevant as insurers are in the 
position to influence consumers’ and providers’ utilization decisions.38 
In general, competing insurers may seek to encourage utilization that 
increases the marginal benefit resulting from higher RE payments more 
than the marginal cost resulting from higher utilization.37
4  | RESULTS
4.1 | Identifying healthy individuals on the basis of 
multiple- year low spending
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the three groups identi-
fied based on three- year spending below 60%, 70%, or 80%. 
Unsurprisingly, the mean spending threshold (in euros), the size of 
the group identified, and the mean spending increase with higher 
thresholds. The opposite holds for the mean overcompensation, 
which reduces from 231 euro for the 60% threshold to 185 euro 
for the 80% threshold. Thus, in terms of mean overcompensation 
and spending, the 60% threshold yields the most selective group. 
However, the total overcompensation (ie, taking the size of the group 
TABLE  1 Mean (predicted) spending and overcompensation for adult individuals in the administrative data (2014) and for survey 
respondents (2012) who successfully match with the administrative data
Adult individuals in administrative  
data (2014)
Survey respondents (2012) who  
match with administrative data (2014)
Weighted number of individualsa 12 659 298 375 742
Mean actual spending (€)b 2590 2561*
Mean predicted spending (€) 2587 2607*
Mean under/overcompensation (€)c −3 46*
aThe number of individuals who were at least 19 y old on September 1, 2012 weighted by the duration of enrollment in 2014. The total weighted num-
ber of individuals in the administrative data of 2014 is 16 607 620, with mean spending of €2227. 
bSpending refers to spending on curative somatic care (eg, primary care, pharmaceutical care, and hospital care) covered by the benefits package of 
2017 (cost/price level of 2014). 
cDefined as the mean predicted spending in 2014 (based on the RE model 2017) minus the mean actual spending in 2014.
*Statistically significantly different from the corresponding number for the administrative data, based on a two- sided t test (P < 0.05). 
TABLE  2 Characteristics of three groups of individuals designated as “healthy” on the basis of multiple- year low spending (2011- 2013) 
using three different spending thresholds
Group identified based on
Mean spending 
threshold (€)
Weighted %  
of individuals  
in 2014 (%)a
Mean 
spending  
in 2014 (€)b
Mean  
overcompensation in 
2014 (€)c
Total  
overcompensation in 
2014 (millions of €)d
Three- year spending <60% 662 41.0 717 231 1571
Three- year spending <70% 1081 53.2 796 208 1836
Three- year spending <80% 1916 66.5 943 185 2040
aThe number of individuals weighted by the duration of enrollment in 2014 as a percentage of the total population in 2014 (16 607 620). 
bSpending refers to spending on curative somatic care (eg, primary care, pharmaceutical care, and hospital care) covered by the benefits package of 
2017, at the cost/price level of 2014. The overall mean total spending in 2014 equals €2227. 
cDefined as the mean predicted spending in 2014 (based on the Dutch RE model 2017) minus the mean actual spending in 2014. 
dDefined as the mean overcompensation in 2014 multiplied by the weighted number of individuals in the relevant group. 
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into account) is considerably higher for the higher thresholds and 
highest based on the 80% threshold.
An additional analysis (data not shown) revealed that increasing 
the threshold further (eg, to 81%) would not yield an even higher 
total overcompensation: While the 1% group with three- year spend-
ing below 80% but not below 79% is still overcompensated, the 1% 
group with three- year spending below 81% but not below 80% is 
undercompensated.
We also examined the modality “low spending in two out of three 
prior years” and found that the mean overcompensation in 2014 for 
the resulting group (comprising 50% of the whole population) is almost 
10% lower than the group identified based on three- year spending 
below 70%. Since this modality thus results in a less selective group 
and involves much lower spending thresholds (around 400 euro, which 
will probably be considered problematic in the light of insurers’ cost- 
containment incentives), we did not investigate this modality further.
4.2 | Payment fit
This section compares the fit of the RE model 2017 and three alter-
native versions of that model. The alternative versions all include 
a MYLS- based indicator but use different thresholds to assign 
individuals to that indicator. Note that adding such an indicator 
implies that the group not classified in the existing “multiple- year 
high spending” (MYHS) adjuster is essentially split into two, that is, 
(a) a group with MYLS and (b) a group without MYLS and without 
MYHS.
The first three rows of Table 3 show that alternative models 2- 4 
clearly outperform model 1 on individual- level fit. Though statis-
tically significant, the difference in fit among models 2- 4 is small: 
Compared to model 1, the improvement in Cumming’s prediction 
measure (+0.6 to +0.8 percentage point) is relatively large, while the 
R- squared improves only marginally.
Table 3 also shows the estimated coefficients for relevant risk 
classes. The coefficient of interest in model 1 is that of the class “No 
MYHS”:	−287	euro.	In	models	2-	4,	this	class	is	split	into	two,	explic-
itly distinguishing between individuals with MYLS, and those with-
out MYLS and without MYHS. In model 3, for example, this yields a 
coefficient	of	−565	for	the	group	with	MYLS	and	a	coefficient	of	32	
euro for the complementary group. As the threshold goes up, the 
latter group becomes more selective and the accompanying coeffi-
cient higher, up to 249 euro in model 4. This illustrates how adding 
TABLE  3  Individual- level payment fit and estimated coefficients for relevant risk classes for four versions of the Dutch RE model 2017
Model 1 = RE model 2017
Model 2 = model 1 + a risk  
class for 3- y spending <60%
Model 3 = model 1 + a risk  
class for 3- y spending <70%
Model 4 = model 1 + a risk  
class for 3- y spending <80%
Fit statistica
R- squared × 100% 28.7 28.8 28.8 28.8
Cumming’s 
prediction 
measure × 100%
28.1 28.7 28.9 28.9
Mean absolute 
prediction error 
(€)
2021 2002 1999 1998
Estimated coefficients (€)
No MYHS −287 - - -
Three- year 
spending <60%
- −576 - -
≥One-	year	
spending	≥60%	
and no MYHS
- −87 - -
Three- year 
spending <70%
- - −565 -
≥One-	year	
spending	≥70%	
and no MYHS
- - 32 -
Three- year 
spending <80%
- - - −543
≥One-	year	
spending	≥80%	
and no MYHS
- - - 249
MYHS, multiple- year high spending.
aR-	squared	=	proportion	explained	variance	=	1	−	(sum	of	squared	residuals/total	sum	of	squared	spending	differences).	Cumming’s	prediction	mea-
sure	=	1	−	(sum	of	absolute	residuals/total	sum	of	absolute	spending	differences).	Mean	absolute	prediction	error	=	sum	of	absolute	residuals	divided	
by the weighted number of individuals. 
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an indicator based on MYLS can improve compensation for both in-
dividuals in good health and individuals in moderate or poor health.
As a result of adding a MYLS- based indicator, the overcompen-
sation on the groups designated as healthy (see Table 2) naturally 
reduces to zero. Table 4 compares the models on payment fit for 
28 other groups, derived from the health survey data. Based on the 
overall figure shown at the bottom of the table, each of the alterna-
tive models improves upon the fit of the RE model 2017, with model 
4	yielding	the	largest	improvement	(−18%	compared	to	model	1).
Adding an indicator based on MYLS improves the compensation 
for 23 of the 25 groups with an overrepresentation of individuals in 
poor health, the exceptions being the groups “1 self- reported chronic 
condition (past year)” and “diabetes (ever).” Interestingly, both are 
overcompensated by the RE model 2017, and adding the indicator 
apparently increases this overcompensation somewhat, though for 
“diabetes (ever)” the overcompensation is not statistically significant 
for any model.
The results for the three remaining groups are of particular in-
terest as they are overrepresented by individuals in good health, that 
is, the 77% individuals assessing their own health as good or very 
good, the 40% individuals reporting no chronic condition over the 
past year, and the 33% individuals that can be found in both of these 
groups. For these three groups, the improvement in fit is relatively 
modest: The overcompensation drops by maximally 7% (model 4), 
19% (model 3), and 21% (model 3), respectively.
To further investigate this, we calculated the number of survey 
respondents in the relevant group as a percentage of the total num-
ber of survey respondents with MYLS, separately for each thresh-
old. Conversely, we calculated the number of survey respondents 
with MYLS as a percentage of the total respondents comprising 
each group. The results are shown in Table 5 and suggest that (a) 
the group identified based on MYLS contains relatively many indi-
viduals in poor self- reported health (see the top three rows) and (b) 
many of the respondents comprising the three subgroups are not 
designated as “healthy” based on MYLS (bottom three rows). Both 
could explain the fairly modest improvement in fit for these three 
subgroups.
4.3 | Cost- containment incentives
A potential drawback of an indicator based on MYLS is that it could 
mitigate insurers’ incentives for cost containment. If an individual 
exceeds the relevant spending threshold at least once in the three 
prior years, based on the coefficients shown in Table 3, this implies 
an extra RE payment for his/her insurer in the current year of around 
560 euro (relative to the situation in which the individual would stay 
below the threshold in the entire three- year period). This could stim-
ulate insurers to (a) behave strategically (ie, not preventing individu-
als from slightly exceeding the relevant spending threshold) and/
or (b) refrain from enacting specific cost- containment strategies. 
However, it is unlikely that insurers will actually act on these incen-
tives in practice as the potential benefits are either highly uncertain 
or unlikely to be worth the additional costs.
Regarding the former, using a percentage instead of an absolute 
threshold makes the potential benefits of strategic behavior uncer-
tain as they depend on the actions of other insurers. In addition, re-
garding individuals who already remained below the threshold for 
2 years, close to the end of the third year, insurers would have to 
determine whether these individuals will stay under the threshold 
again and if so, to take action. But at that moment, claims for ongoing 
treatments and for treatments that have yet to start are not avail-
able. Furthermore, even if insurers would succeed in pushing certain 
individuals over the spending threshold (and these individuals do not 
switch to other insurers, which about 25% of the individuals iden-
tified based on the 70% threshold did in the three prior years), the 
resulting additional RE payments may well be one- off as individuals 
could require an expensive treatment in the next year. Moreover, the 
utilization required to push individuals over the threshold generates 
additional claims, reducing net benefits.
To illustrate that the benefits from not enacting specific cost- 
containment strategies are unlikely to be worth the costs, we cal-
culated the additional RE payments (based on each of the three 
alternative RE models) that would be generated if a medium- sized 
insurer would let his insurance claims increase generically by 1% 
in the prior year (2013). In our data, this would imply a 370 million 
euro increase in claims, which for the 60%, 70%, and 80% threshold 
would result in a 21, 23, and 27 million euro increase in RE payment 
as a result of a 0.26%, 0.23%, and 0.22% increase in enrollees ex-
ceeding the threshold, respectively. In other words, to gain 1 euro in 
additional payments in the current year, depending on the threshold 
insurers must “invest” 18 euro (=370/21), 16 euro (=370/23), or 14 
euro (=370/27) in the prior year.
5  | DISCUSSION
In the sophisticated Dutch RE model 2017, about 27% of the popu-
lation is flagged by a morbidity- based risk adjuster. Although the 
complementary group is implicitly designated as healthy, this group 
is heterogeneous in terms of health and spending. Consequently, 
risk- selection potential exists in this group, which is undesirable in 
view of the unfavorable effects of risk selection and the finding that 
risk selection has also been driven by overcompensated groups of 
individuals in good health.13,15,20-27 This paper investigated the ex-
tent to which the fit of the RE model can be improved by explicitly 
identifying individuals likely to be healthy (in absolute sense) using 
an indicator- based multiple- year low spending. Based on three defi-
nitions of “low spending,” three alternative versions of the Dutch 
RE model 2017 were constructed and subsequently compared. We 
came to four main conclusions. First, all three alternative models 
that contain an indicator for “being healthy” outperform the RE 
model 2017 in terms of payment fit. This conclusion holds both at 
the individual level and at the level of 28 specific subgroups from 
a health survey and suggests that adding an indicator for “being 
healthy” would reduce risk- selection potential in the Dutch health 
insurance market.
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Regarding group- level fit, compensation not only improves for 
groups that are overrepresented by individuals in good health, but 
also for almost all groups comprising individuals with a self- reported 
chronic condition. The explanation is that the reduced RE payment for 
the healthy implies a higher RE payment for their unhealthy counter-
parts. For three large groups of individuals in good self- reported health, 
however, the improvement in fit is modest, indicating that the groups 
designated as healthy based on low prior spending contain relatively 
many people with a poor self- reported health, and vice versa. Indeed, 
an additional analysis on the survey sample showed that the identified 
groups of healthy individuals are to some extent heterogeneous, sug-
gesting that MYLS is not entirely measuring what it is intended to mea-
sure, which is “being healthy.” Unfortunately, with the data available, 
it was not possible to conduct further validations and determine what 
the MYLS indicator is actually measuring in addition to good health.
In theory, compensation for the three subgroups that are over-
represented by individuals in good health can be improved by ex-
plicitly including the relevant survey variables into the RE model. In 
practice, however, this is problematic as these data are not available 
for the whole population. If incorporating this information in the RE 
model is nonetheless considered desirable, other estimation meth-
ods, such as constrained least squares regression, may be required 
(A. A. Withagen-Koster, R. C. van Kleef, & F. Eijkenaar, To be submit-
ted for publication).39
The second conclusion is that although differences are small, the 
improvement in fit increases with the share of individuals designated 
as healthy. As compared to the 60% and 70% thresholds, the 80% 
threshold discriminates more between the designated group and the 
complementary group. Also, the total overcompensation (ie, taking 
account of the size of the group) is highest under the 80% threshold. 
In terms of the mean overcompensation, however, the 80% thresh-
old yields a less selective group as compared to the groups identified 
based on the two lower thresholds.
We did not differentiate the spending threshold(s) for poten-
tially relevant enrollee characteristics (such as yes/no morbidity 
classification). The reason is that our goal was to identify individuals 
who are healthy in absolute sense (and not in relative sense, eg, in-
dividuals with relatively low- spending levels within the group with 
a morbidity classification), which was informed by the fact that se-
lection actions by Dutch insurers over the past decade have mainly 
been targeted at those types of individuals. Nonetheless, we ac-
knowledge that a differentiated threshold might be able to further 
reduce unpriced risk heterogeneity within the group of chronically 
ill individuals, which will reduce incentives to attract the relatively 
healthy individuals within this group (and to deter the relatively 
unhealthy). We believe this is an interesting topic for follow- up 
research.
The third conclusion is that insurers’ incentives for cost contain-
ment are unlikely to be materially affected by adding an indicator 
based on MYLS. Concerns about these incentives being reduced 
might seem justified since a link is created between spending and 
payments, which could stimulate insurers to behave strategically 
and/or to refrain from enacting specific cost- containment strate-
gies. However, our results indicate that the likelihood of insurers 
acting on these incentives will be low in practice because, at least 
in the Dutch context, the benefits are either uncertain or unlikely 
to be worth the costs. It must be noted, however, that our data did 
not permit explicit modeling of the likelihood and impact of stra-
tegic behavior under different MYLS modalities, which may have 
been more informative. Assessing how and to what extent insur-
ers in general respond to the introduction of spending- based risk 
adjusters in RE models is an important topic for future research.
A related limitation is that although the goal of the Dutch RE 
model is to compensate insurers for predictable, health-related vari-
ation in spending, introducing a MYLS variable to the model would 
undoubtedly result in insurers also being partly compensated for 
variation related to factors other than health, such as enrollees’ pro-
clivity to consume health care and insurers’ efficiency. In general, this 
also holds for the other diagnosis- /utilization- based risk adjusters in 
the model and inevitably involves a trade- off with no obvious escape.
TABLE  5 Heterogeneity of three groups of individuals designated as “healthy” on the basis of multiple- year low spending (2011- 2013) 
using three different spending thresholds
Survey respondents as a percentage of
All respondents with 3- y  
spending <60%
All respondents with 3- y  
spending <70%
All respondents with 3- y 
spending <80%
(Very) good self- reported healtha 92% 90% 87%
No self- reported conditiona 60% 56% 51%
(Very) good self- reported health and 
no self- reported conditiona
51% 47% 42%
All respondents with (very)  
good self-reported healtha
All respondents with no  
self-reported conditiona
All respondents with (very) 
good self-reported health and 
no self-reported conditiona
Three- year spending below 60% 44% 56% 57%
Three- year spending below 70% 56% 67% 69%
Three- year spending below 80% 69% 78% 79%
aSubgroup defined based on the health survey data. 
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The final conclusion is that regardless of the model or threshold 
used, unpriced risk heterogeneity in the Dutch individual health in-
surance market remains considerable. This is consistent with findings 
from recent other studies conducted in the Dutch context (R. C. Van 
Kleef, F. Eijkenaar, & R. C. J. A. van Vliet, under review)19,36 as well as in 
other countries with sophisticated morbidity- based RE models.10,12-17 
An interesting direction for further research is to investigate the ex-
tent to which remaining risk- selection potential in these countries can 
be meaningfully mitigated further by introducing new risk adjusters or 
that the focus should shift to other potential solutions such as alterna-
tive estimation methods (A. A. Withagen-Koster, R. C. van Kleef, & F. 
Eijkenaar, To be submitted for publication),3,39 sophisticated forms of 
ex post risk- sharing,37,40 and relaxing premium regulation.
In conclusion, the performance of the Dutch RE model can be im-
proved by adding an indicator for “being healthy” based on multiple- 
year low spending. Irrespective of which spending threshold is 
ultimately used, however, risk- selection potential remains. Given 
that risk selection is highly undesirable, further improvement of RE 
merits high priority.
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